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Abstract 
A sample of almost 100 judges exhibited well-known patterns of biases in risk beliefs and 
reasonable implicit values of life.  These biases and personal preferences largely do not affect 
attitudes toward judicial risk decisions, though there are some exceptions, such as ambiguity 
aversion, misinterpretation of negligence rules, and retrospective risk assessments in accident 
cases, which is a form of hindsight bias.  Although judges avoided many pitfalls exhibited by 
jurors and the population at large, they nevertheless exhibited systematic errors, particularly for 
small probability-large loss events.  These findings highlighted the importance of judicial review 
and the input of expert risk analysts to assist judicial decisions in complex risk cases.   
Key words: risk perceptions, hindsight bias, punitive damages, value of life, irrationality. 
JEL classification: D-80, J-17 
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A wide body of research indicates that decisions involving risk and uncertainty are 
sufficiently complex that people do not always behave as would be predicted in a full 
information and rational economic decision world.  Risk beliefs are often biased in systematic 
ways, and subsequent decisions may be flawed as well.  Not all of these problems lead to risk 
levels that are too high compared to an efficiency reference point.  Most well-established biases 
generate excessive and alarmist responses to risk. 
These problems in individual behavior create difficulties for the responses of social 
institutions to risk.  In a democratic society, governmental action is responsive to citizen 
preferences.  If these preferences are flawed because of errors in risk perception or erroneous 
decisions, then the pressures on governmental action may serve to institutionalize individual 
irrationalities.  In addition, because government officials are also human, they too may exhibit 
the same types of biases and errors that characterize individual behavior.  Substantial evidence 
indicates that the governmental operation of hazardous waste cleanup efforts, pharmaceutical 
regulation, risk assessment practices, and a wide variety of other aspects of government risk 
regulation embody the same types of irrationality that have been identified in the literature 
dealing with irrationality of choice under uncertainty.1  The result has been a diversion of 
resources to address inconsequential risks and comparative neglect of the more fundamental risks 
we face. 
One might well raise a similar kind of concern with respect to judges.  Since judges are 
individuals, they may be prone to the same types of irrationalities as are other people.  To what 
extent do these various forms of irrationality carry over to how they think about risk decisions?  
Judges play a critical role in terms of how society responds to risk through the judicial system.  If 
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we wish to make our social institutions more effective in controlling risk sensibly, we need to 
understand whether these decisions are flawed and, if so, in what way.   
Judges are not a random draw from the population and may not reflect all the usual 
patterns of error.  They should be less prone to the kinds of biases and risk decision errors 
exhibited by the populace more generally.  In addition to being better educated than the average 
individual, judges are also experienced observers of risky decisions.  After having handled a 
large series of cases involving accidents and hearing the testimony presented by both sides, 
judges should be much better able to put risk decisions in perspective.  Judges are also able to 
observe the outcome in these cases and whether the decisions are overturned on appeal.  Since 
the appeals process provides a check on judicial errors, observation of this feedback mechanism 
should enhance judges’ ability to make sounder risk decisions over time.   
This paper will examine the responses by a sample of 95 state judges to a written survey 
about risk decisions.  Although reliance on the results of a questionnaire may not capture the 
particular biases that are most influential in actual judicial decisions, it does provide a structured 
framework for exploring a wider range of issues than can be examined using case data.  The 
judges in the sample were participants in the law and economics programs offered by the 
University of Kansas Law and Organizational Economics Center.  The judges were sent these 
written surveys before the program began and returned the surveys before participating in the 
program, where the survey formed the basis for class discussion.  The response rate was close to 
100 percent.  The sample consisted of program participants in two different sessions, both of 
which took place in 1997.  Although the meetings were in Copper Mountain, Colorado, and 
Sanibel, Florida, participants in the program were from state courts throughout the country.  The 
participants included many judges from state courts of appeals, state superior courts, and state 
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supreme courts.  The experience base of the sample consequently is likely to be greater than that 
of the average state court judge.  
The two main reference points for analyzing how individual risk attitudes affect risk 
decisions more broadly pertain to judges’ risk perceptions and personal risk tradeoffs.  Section 1 
analyzes the mortality risk beliefs of judges and compares these responses to the well-established 
pattern of biased mortality risk perceptions that has been found in the literature.  A new element 
of this analysis is that I construct estimates on an individual basis of the person’s risk perception 
function, making it possible to analyze whether the pattern of individual risk beliefs affects 
attitudes toward risky decisions more generally.  The second issue pertaining to personal risk 
preferences is the individual’s risk tradeoff in terms of the value of life, which is the subject of 
Section 2.  A key question to be examined is whether biases in risk perceptions and the 
individual’s personal willingness to bear risk affect the judge’s attitude toward prospective 
judicial decisions involving accidents and other risky outcomes.   
Using these aspects of individual risk beliefs and preferences, we then turn to three 
different areas of judicial decisionmaking.  This portion of the article examines potential errors in 
judicial decisionmaking as well as the influence of judges’ risk beliefs and personal risk 
preferences on these judgments.  Section 3 analyzes the process of handling judicial tradeoffs in 
accident cases.  In particular, to what extent do the judges apply economic principles for 
negligence correctly?  Because courts operate after the fact rather than before an accident has 
occurred, a central concern is the role of hindsight bias, which is the subject of Section 4.  Judges 
perform much better than mock jurors in this class of concerns.  Another source of anomalies is 
that risks are often not known with precision.  There may be substantial ambiguity pertaining to 
the degree of hazard.  Do the same kinds of biases associated with risk ambiguity and individual 
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behavior as reflected in the classic Ellsberg paradox also pertain to how judges view risky 
situations?  After examining this issue in Section 5, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
A recurring theme in these results is that judges exhibit a variety of biases, some of which 
have been documented for human behavior more generally.  Many of the departures from fully 
rational decision making have direct implications for judicial decisions, such as the failure to 
interpret negligence rules correctly.  The influence of hindsight bias on the retrospective 
assessment of an accident situation is also directly pertinent, but most judges were not prone to 
hindsight bias.  Other biases, heuristics, and personal attitudes may have an indirect effect on 
how judges make risk-related decisions.  Biases in risk beliefs and the judge’s personal 
willingness to bear risk are two such personal differences.  The analysis below will explore the 
extent to which these influences have a broader effect on how judges view legal doctrines, such 
as the application of negligence rules.  The reassuring result is that in many instances judges’ 
personal biases and beliefs do not have a broader contaminating effect. 
Judges, nevertheless, are prone to a variety of systematic errors.  Their interpretation of 
legal rules and accident situations often falls short of the usual law and economics efficiency 
reference points.  These shortcomings highlight the importance of judicial review as well as the 
input of objective risk analysis that can assist the courts in thinking about risk in a systematic and 
unbiased manner.   
 
1.  Mortality Risk Perceptions 
One of the most well-established results in the literature on risk is that people 
systematically overestimate small mortality risks and systematically underestimate large 
mortality risks.  However, hidden hazards in situations of ignorance may not be perceived at all.2  
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In the case of identified risks, there is a well documented, systematic relationship between 
people’s perception of the risk and the actual value of the risk.  This relationship varies 
depending on the size of the risk.  Lichtenstein et al. (1978) found that people systematically 
erred in their risk perceptions in this manner, and Morgan (1983) replicated this result.3  These 
studies involved convenience samples of students and other groups, whereas this study will use a 
large group of state judges. The observed pattern of biases in risk beliefs found in such studies 
also plays a central role as an assumption in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory 
model and as a principal prediction in Viscusi’s (1989) prospective reference theory model.  
These models do, however, incorporate recognition of a variety of other biases, heuristics, and 
characterizations of preferences that lead to departures from the standard expected utility model. 
Although people may not estimate risks correctly, this pattern of biases may not 
necessarily imply irrationality.  Much of the literature has treated the risk perception bias finding 
at face value as indicating a form of irrationality or quasi-rationality, but there are other 
interpretations of this effect that are quite consistent with rational behavior consistent with 
Bayesian expected utility maximization.  Viscusi (1985) shows that the patterns in the 
Lichtenstein et al. data follow the pattern predicted using a rational Bayesian risk belief model.  
Suppose, for example, that people start with the same prior risk beliefs for all classes of 
accidents.  They can, however, acquire partial information about the risks involved through their 
own experience, the media, hazard warnings, and other mechanisms.  A rational learning process 
will move their beliefs partially in the direction of the true probability, but their perceptions will 
not reach it because of the lack of full information.  As a result, we would expect to observe the 
well-known pattern in which small risks tended to be overestimated and larger risks 
underestimated.  Such an effect will occur to the extent that people learn but do not move 
 6 
completely in the direction of the true risk from their prior risk beliefs, which do not fully 
distinguish different degrees of riskiness by cause of death.   
Other explanations of the observed phenomena depend on the character of the risk.  
Viscusi, Hakes, and Carlin (1997) show that much of the claimed bias in risk perception is 
attributable to the different length of life lost from different sources of risk.  Risks with a longer 
future lifetime that is lost receive a greater perceptional weight than risks with a smaller future 
lifetime at risk.  Benjamin and Dougan (1997) also find that the risk perception data may be 
consistent with a rational expectations model in which people use the hazard rates for people in 
their own age group in forming their risk perceptions.4  Thus, respondents may have been 
indicating assessed probabilities for risks to themselves, not the population at large.   
Irrespective of the interpretation of the phenomenon and whether it involves a departure 
from rational behavior, the size-related risk bias is real and of potential consequence.  If people 
overestimate the level of the risk, they will tend to value safety too greatly, as compared to the 
perfect information case.  Markets will generate too great a level of safety.  If they underestimate 
the level of the risk, they will value safety too little.  Effective hazard warnings efforts have a 
potentially productive role to play in these instances.  The observed patterns of risk perception 
biases indicate that we pay far too much attention to the small risks in our lives and far too little 
attention to the truly major risks that we face.  Risk communication efforts, if effective, could 
potentially ameliorate these distortions.  To the extent that liability and other risks addressed in 
court cases are small, they will be prone to overestimation and excessive court awards.   
This phenomenon is pertinent for assessing how well judges think about risks as well.  
Judges are the arbiters of how the legal system treats risk in a wide variety of contexts including 
accidents, medical malpractice cases, and product liability cases, as well as cases involving dimly 
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understood health risks, such as breast implants.  Do judges share the same kinds of biases that 
are reflected in individual behavior and, more importantly, do these biases intrude upon their 
thinking about judicial decisions?  The survey results presented here will examine the pattern of 
judges’ perceptional biases and will then explore whether these biases intrude upon legal 
judgments.   
Table 1 summarizes the different causes of death for which the judges’ risk beliefs were 
elicited.  That table also reports their associated risk values, where most of these causes of death 
overlap with categories considered in previous studies.  The table lists these causes in order of 
their importance in terms of the number of deaths associated with the cause in 1993.  The total 
number of deaths for the different causes ranged from two deaths from botulism to over two 
million deaths per year from all causes.5  
Respondents were not given the list of deaths in order of importance and were not told the 
actual death rate.  Rather, the judges received the following information:   
In 1990, 47,000 people died in automobile accidents.  How many people died from the 
other causes of death listed below?  Fill in your best estimate in the space.   
Respondents then considered each of the causes of death listed in Table 1, but in a 
random order.  Table 1 reports the actual death risk levels, the mean perceived deaths, and the 
geometric mean of perceived deaths (the measure most often used in previous studies).  The 
responses by the judges reflect the widely observed pattern of overestimating small risks and 
underestimating larger risks.  In particular, based on the geometric mean values in the final 
column of Table 1,  judges overestimate all risks in the lower risk categories, from botulism to 
accidental firearm discharges. Thereafter, they underestimate all of the larger risk groups from 
accidental drowning to all causes of death, with the exception being stomach cancer, which they 
underestimate by a very small amount.  The main difference in the patterns displayed by the 
mean perceived deaths as opposed to the geometric means is that for the mean values there is a 
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much wider range of death categories for which people overestimate the risk, ranging from 
botulism to diabetes and including lung cancer as well.   
To analyze the properties of these risk responses further, Table 2 reports estimates of 
equations that are variants of the following three formulations for linking perceived death risk 
categories j with the actual death risk categories j and, where appropriate, individual i:  
 
ijijij hsActualDeateathsPerceivedD 11 )ln()ln( ∈++= βα      (1) 
ijijijij hsActualDeathsActualDeateathsPerceivedD 2
2
21 )][ln()ln()ln( ∈+++= ββα , (2) 




21 )][ln()ln()ln( ∈+++= ββα . (4) 
 
Equation 1 is a simple linear equation linking the log of perceived deaths with the log of 
actual deaths, where this and all other regressions are based on the unit of observation of the 
individual response to each question.  All individuals are pooled in the regression, leading to 
1,874 observations.  Equation 2 adds a quadratic term to the estimation.  To account for the 
possibility that there are person-specific differences in risk beliefs, equations 3 and 4 include a 
person-specific intercept term in the counterparts to equations 1 and 2.  Thus, these latter two 
equations are fixed effects models in which person-specific differences in the level of risk beliefs 
are reflected in an intercept. Finally, I also estimate, but do not report here, a separate equation 
for each individual judge given by 
 
ijijiiij hsActualDeateathsPerceivedD 21 )ln()ln( ∈++= βα .    (5) 
   
The estimates of equation 5 give rise to an intercept term and a slope coefficient that is 
specific to each individual in the sample based on the responses to the risk.  I will designate these 
 9 
values by iα̂ and iβ̂ .  These parameter values will play a critical role in a subsequent analysis, as 
they will serve as measures of the individual’s own patterns of risk perception biases.  The range 
of the iα̂ values was from –0.19 to 8.26.  Since the variables are in logs, the intercept terms are in 
a plausible range, indicating an assessed risk value if the true risk is zero ranging from 0.83 to 
3,866 deaths per year.  The range for the iβ̂ values was from 0.22 to 0.84.  The slope coefficients 
indicate a partial responsiveness of perceived to actual risks, ranging from 22-84 percent, i.e., a 
100 percent increase in the actual risk boosts risk beliefs by 22 to 84 percent.      
Table 2 summarizes the regression equation estimates of equations 1 to 4.    All reported 
standard errors are robust standard errors that take into account the clustering of multiple 
mortality risk estimates per individual.  In a linear specification there is a positive intercept term, 
which reflects the overestimation of small risks.  Even very small risks will have associated a 
perceived risk value in excess of the actual risk level.  The slope coefficient of 0.59 in both the 
ordinary least squares and the fixed effects estimates indicate that respondents are responsive to 
risk levels, but less than proportionally.  The quadratic term estimates in equations 2 and 4 are 
both positive, indicating that the relationship between the log of perceived deaths and the log of 
actual deaths becomes increasingly close to the 45 degree line as one moves to the larger risk 
categories.  
Figure 1 presents the estimates based on equation 2 in Table 2.  As is indicated, the 
judges overassess the small risks, such as botulism and fireworks accidents, and underestimate 
the larger risks of death, such as stroke and heart disease.  It is noteworthy that the extent of the 
overestimation of the small risks is much greater than the extent of the underestimation for large 
risks.  People tend to have much less information and a smaller sample size on which to base 
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estimates for the very small risks that they face, making these judgments much more imprecise 
than the risk assessments for the more consequential hazards.  Thus, this figure indicates that the 
nature of the size-related bias in risk beliefs is more than simply a situation of overestimating 
small risks and underestimating large risks.  There is also evidence that the absolute value of the 
gap between risk beliefs and the true risk levels narrows as one moves to the very high-risk 
categories.  For the truly significant risks, the judges do quite well in terms of the accuracy of the 
risk assessments.  
Overall, however, judges did exhibit the general character of biases found in other 
studies.  In the subsequent analysis I will use the judge-specific estimates of iα̂ and iβ̂ as 
measures of the character of the judges risk beliefs.  Do, for example, judges with high values of 
iα̂ , indicating substantial overestimation of small risks, behave differently in their treatment of 
accident cases than judges who are less prone to overestimating small risks?  Similarly, is the 
extent of the relationship between perceived and actual mortality risks in terms of the slope of 
this function iβ̂ influential in driving judges’ views on risk issues more generally?  Thus, the 
broader question for which these estimates will serve as the main building block is whether 
person-specific biases in risk beliefs contaminate other aspects of judicial behavior. 
 
2.  The Value of Life 
A critical variable that may affect judges’ assessment of risk situations is their own 
attitude toward risks to life and health.  The most commonly used measure of the individual’s 
implicit value of life is the person’s risk-money tradeoff for mortality risks.  This amount is not 
the level of compensation required to make one indifferent to certain death.  No amount of 
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money may suffice.  Rather, it is the risk-money tradeoff  rate that is pertinent when facing small 
risks of death, or the value of a statistical life.  In the usual context in which one is purchasing a 
product that must be made safer or instituting a government regulation to foster safety, the 
measure I advocate is society’s willingness to pay for the reduction in risk.  This value provides 
the basis for determining what the reference point should be in terms of the level of society’s 
investment in greater safety.  This measure is now used throughout the U.S. Federal government 
to value risks to life and health.  Although the usual reference point for assessing the implicit 
value of life is the wage-risk tradeoff reflected in workers’ job choices, a number of other studies 
have also examined the tradeoff reflected in stated willingness to pay questions.6  For 
environmental losses and for many refined health effects, such as cancer, it is necessary to utilize 
survey methods rather than direct estimation techniques based on labor market information.  This 
section reports on the survey value-of-life estimates as reflected in the judges’ responses to a risk 
question.  
In particular, the judges answered the following question framed in terms of their 
willingness to pay for a reduction in mortality risk:   
Suppose that participating in this course poses a one-time only risk of death of 1/10,000.  
Thus, if there were 10,000 judges in this course, there would be one expected death in your 
group.  This risk is the average annual mortality risk faced on the job by the typical U. S. blue-
collar worker.  Which dollar range best reflects the amount you are willing to pay to eliminate 
this risk you have taken? 
 
Judges then considered six-dollar ranges from zero to fifty dollars to a high range of 
above $1,000, where the survey also included a final category of “infinite-all present and future 
resources.” Calculating the implicit value of life from these responses is straightforward and 
indicates what is actually meant by the value of life terminology.  Suppose, for example, that a 
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judge responded that an amount between $200 and $500 would be appropriate for reducing the 
mortality risk by 1/10,000.  Let us take the midpoint of this range, or $350 dollars, as the 
pertinent value for the respondent.  Suppose that there were 10,000 judges with similar 
responses.  Then overall there would be one expected death to this group.  It would be possible to 
raise 10,000x$350, or $3.5 million in order to prevent this one statistical death.  This amount is 
the value of life, which is simply the amount people are willing to pay per statistical death 
averted.  Similarly, one can view the value of life in terms of the willingness to pay per unit risk, 
which is simply $350 divided by 1/10,000, which equals $3.5 million.   
Following this approach, Table 3 indicates the distribution of the value-of-life estimates 
for the judges in the sample.  The mean value of life for the respondents, excluding the three 
judges who indicated an infinite value, was $3.6 million.  The median response was substantially 
less.   
Overall, these responses seem to be somewhat low, but by no means outside of the range 
of estimated value-of-life statistics.  Most estimates based on labor market data indicate an 
implicit value of life on the order of $3 million to $7 million for workers in average risk jobs and 
an implicit value of life in the vicinity of $1 million for workers in higher risk jobs.  Thus, the 
general order of magnitude of the responses seems appropriate.  A reason why it is likely that 
these judges’ responses may tend to be a bit low is that hypothetical survey risks will not be as 
compelling as an actual risk of death.  To the extent that the respondents discount the probability 
of death and treat it as smaller than is stated in the survey, which is certainly appropriate given 
their relatively safe lifestyles, then one would tend to get lower willingness to pay answers and 
consequently lower estimates of the implicit value of life based on survey responses.  
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Table 4 reports on regression results in which the judges’ value-of-life estimates are 
analyzed with respect to the pertinent parameters of the risk perception function for the 
individual judge.  The first set of results is an ordinary least squares regression in which the 
implicit value of life for the judge is regressed against the constant term, the intercept of the 
perception equation iα̂ , and the slope of the risk perception equation for that particular judge iβ̂ .  
Neither of the risk perception coefficients is statistically significant, indicating that any biases in 
mortality risk beliefs apparently do not affect how the judges process the stated risk information 
and then determine their implicit value of life.  This is a favorable result since it indicates that the 
perception of probabilities stated in the survey is not distorted by their more general perceptional 
biases. 
The second set of estimates is a probit analysis of the probability that the respondent 
indicated an infinite value of life.  In this case as well neither of the risk perception variables is 
statistically significant.7   
What these findings suggest is that any biases in risk beliefs that the judges might have do 
not also affect their expressed implicit values of life when faced with a tradeoff between money 
and a stated risk level.  This result does not imply that in situations involving risks to life that 
judges will not misperceive the risk and, in effect, reflect this bias in risk beliefs in subsequent 
decisions.  However, it does suggest that the valuation component of the analysis will not be 
contaminated by any apparent biases in risk perceptions.  In the subsequent analysis of a variety 
of risk decisions, we will use two sets of judge-specific parameters to assess how individual 
judge characteristics affect attitudes towards risk decisions.  The first set of parameters pertains 
to the first two risk perception parameters iα̂ and iβ̂ , and the second class of influences will be 
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those pertaining to risk attitudes, which will be captured using the estimate of the implicit value 
of life for that judge.  
 
3.  Judicial Tradeoffs—Negligence Rules 
The standard economic prescription for determining an efficient level of safety is whether 
the benefits of the safety improvement exceed the cost.  For continuous changes in safety, the 
question is whether safety levels have been increased until the marginal benefits just equal the 
marginal costs.  These same kinds of principles form the foundation for law and economics 
interpretation of negligence rules as well.8  
Judges considered one of three survey questions designed to test the degree to which they 
would apply the principles embodied in this standard negligence test.  The cost of the safety 
improvement in every instance was $2,000.  In addition, the expected benefits of the safety 
improvement, which equal the reduction in the risk probability multiplied by the size of the loss, 
equal $1,500 in every instance.  Thus, applying the negligence rule as cast in law and economics 
terms would suggest that the safety measure is not efficient and that the firm should not be held 
liable for the repair.   
The three experimental manipulations varied the probability of the accident and the size 
of the loss but held constant the expected value of the loss that would be prevented by 
undertaking the $2,000 repair.  In the first instance, judges considered a property damage loss of 
$15,000 coupled with a risk probability of 1/10 that would be eliminated through the safety 
repair.  The expected loss is consequently $1,500, which is less than the repair cost.  The second 
variant increased the size of the property damage by a factor of 100 to $1.5 million, reducing the 
probability of loss by a factor of 100 to equal 1/1,000, leaving the expected loss unchanged at 
$1,500.  The third variant increased the size of the loss to $1.5 billion, which included the value 
of personal injury losses, and accompanied it with a probability of the loss of 1/1,000,000.  Thus, 
this change scaled losses up by a factor of 1,000 and scaled the probability down by a factor of 
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1,000, leaving the expected loss unchanged.  For the personal injury question, the lives lost were 
valued at $5 million/life and respondents were told that this amount would reflect the full social 
value of the loss.  In every instance, the survey indicated that the company had sufficient 
resources to pay the damages. 9 
An example of one of these questions (the intermediate case) is the following:   
 
You are CEO of Rocky Mountain Airline.  The cargo door on the plane does not operate 
properly.  Fixing it costs $2,000.  If it is not fixed, there is absolutely no safety risk.  Very 
reliable engineering estimates indicate that there is only a 1/1,000 chance over the expected life 
of the plane that there will be a total loss to your company of $1.5 million due to property 
damage caused by this problem.  Thus, there is a 999/1,000 chance that there will be no damage 
whatsoever.  Your company has no insurance but does have sufficient resources to pay these 
damages. 10  
Respondents were then asked to circle whether or not the firm should undertake the repair 
and second, if the repair is not undertaken and there was $1.5 million in property damages, to 
indicate whether punitive damages should be awarded. 
How one views the scenario depends in part on the test being applied.  The CEO of the 
company should presumably be concerned with profit maximization.  The safety measures 
described involved financial effects that would all be internalized by the firm.  Since safety 
improvements fail a benefit-cost test, they would not enhance firm profitability.  Judges 
responding as CEOs might, however, impute a loss in the value of the company’s reputation in 
the event of an accident involving personal injury, making them more likely to advocate safety 
improvements in this instance. 
Application of legal rules should not be affected by broadly based reputational effects.  If 
a safety measure does not pass a benefit-cost test, the company should not be found negligent for 
failing to adopt it.  Punitive damages pertain to situations of reckless behavior.  To be reckless, 
not only must the foregone safety measure pass a benefit-cost test, but presumably there should 
be a wide spread between benefits and costs, a repeated failure by the company to adopt safe 
practices, or other considerations that make the company truly reckless and not simply negligent.  
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In none of the three scenarios is there any basis for awarding punitive damages.  Indeed, by 
construction the company will never be negligent for failing to adopt the safety improvement. 
Table 5 summarizes the responses to the two questions for each of the risk scenarios.  In 
the case of the low property damage amount, 68% of the judges would not undertake the repair, 
which is consistent with economic efficiency principles.  Almost 1/3 of the sample would 
undertake the repair even though the cost of the repair was below the expected benefits.   
The attitude toward punitive damages in this low loss case shown in Panel A of Table 5 
differs moderately depending on whether repairing the plane to prevent a $15,000 loss is 
attractive.  In each case a minority of the judges believe that punitive damages would apply if the 
repair was not undertaken and a loss occurred, where the fraction favoring punitive damages is 
greater for those who chose to repair the plane.  What is perhaps most striking is that three of the 
judges who did not believe that the plane should be repaired nevertheless would have awarded 
punitive damages had the plane not been repaired and a loss was suffered.  For the entire group, 
18% of the judges would award punitive damages, which is not in line with economic efficiency 
principles since not only are punitive damages not warranted but based on a negligence test the 
repairs should not even be undertaken.   
Panel B of Table 5 indicates how the responses change if the stakes are increased by a 
factor of 100 and the probability of damages is reduced by a factor of 100.  Judges in this 
instance are almost evenly divided as to whether the plane should be repaired.  Respondents who 
did not indicate that repairing the plane was worthwhile almost unanimously opposed punitive 
damages, whereas for the respondents who favored repairing the plane there was an equal 
division between those who supported punitive damages and those who did not.   
The final variation in Panel C increases the loss to $1.5 billion, which includes the value 
of personal injuries, where the survey indicated that this damages amount is intended to reflect 
the full social cost of the accident.  As before, the expected loss is $1,500, but the responses 
differ quite starkly from those in the previous scenarios.  Respondents are now unanimous that 
the plane should be repaired.  Moreover, over two-thirds of the respondents supported punitive 
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damages in this instance.  What appears to be most consequential is that in situations involving 
personal injury, there is a much greater willingness to undertake repairs and impose punitive 
damages than in situations involving property damage even though the expected economic losses 
are the same in each instance.   The results in Panel C for both the award of punitive damages 
and repairing the plane differ to a statistically significant degree from the results in Panels A and 
B.  
Table 6 refines this analysis using probit regressions for the determinant of the probability 
that the respondent will indicate that the cargo door should be repaired and that punitive damages 
should apply.  The level of damages does not have a significant effect on the cargo door repair 
decision.  What does matter is the nonmonetary character of the loss, which was sufficiently 
influential that these respondents could not be included in the repair equation.  There was no 
variation in this scenario group as all respondents in the personal injury variant favored repairing 
the cargo door.  The implicit value of life measures and the risk perception measures are not 
statistically significant except for one instance.  Respondents who had higher values of the 
perception equations slope coefficient iβ̂  were less likely to undertake the cargo door repair.  
Increased values of iβ̂  indicate that the respondents’ assessed probabilities were closer to the 45 
degree line and thus tended to reflect the actual risk level more accurately.  Thus, accurate risk 
beliefs and lower biases in risk perceptions are associated with judges being more willing to act 
according to efficiency norms with respect to the cargo repair decision.  A priori the role of this 
variable is not clear since higher values of iβ̂ could indicate more alarmist responses to risk in 
that perceived risks respond more quickly to changes in actual risks.  However, since all 
iβ̂ values were below 1.0, in this case the variable seems to better reflect the accuracy of risk 
judgments.   
This variable is not, however, directly influential in the punitive damages decision, as the 
only statistically significant variables here are the level of expected damages and whether the 
judge believes that repairing the cargo door was worthwhile.  Thus, to the extent that the risk 
perception slope variable matters it is indirectly in that it increases the probability that the 
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respondent will want to repair the cargo door, which in turn increases the probability that the 
respondent believes that punitive damages should apply.  Overall, however, it seems that 
perceptional biases and the respondent’s own implicit values of life do not play a central role in 
how they would address the negligence issue or the punitive damages issue in this instance.  
Attitudes toward the underlying repair decision and the size of the accident loss are the primary 
factors of consequence.  An attractive aspect of this finding is that personal preferences and 
perceptional biases do not greatly affect negligence judgments.  However, the size of the stakes 
ideally should not matter since the expected losses (i.e. probability x damage) is the same  in 
every instance. 
Although personal risk perception biases and risk valuations do not appear to be 
instrumental, the results are not entirely favorable with respect to the soundness of judicial 
decisions.  In terms of the overall responses to the scenarios, judges were evenly divided between 
repairing and not repairing the plane even though strict application of economic negligence rules 
would indicate that not repairing the plane was desirable.  Moreover, even though the firm was 
not negligent in these examples, many judges believe that punitive damages were applicable, 
particularly when non-monetary losses are high.  Awarding punitive damages when a firm meets 
a negligence standard is certainly inappropriate, as it indicates a failure to reflect on the 
underlying benefit-cost tradeoffs, particularly when there are large nonmonetary stakes.   
This result is a sobering message for companies faced with risk-cost calculations.  If these 
companies follow the urgings of judicial scholars such as Judge Frank Easterbrook and attempt 
to systematically think about the risks and costs of their action,11 then even if they make the 
correct economic decision it is possible that they will risk punitive damages, particularly when 
nonmonetary consequences are involved.  In the GM truck side impact case, GM had calculated 
the cost of the safety improvement and concluded that these costs were not outweighed by the 
expected safety benefits.12  This analysis paralleled the approach taken for the Ford Pinto.  These 
analyses undervalued the personal injury loss by considering only the prospective court awards 
and not also the implicit value of life and health.  However, even the calculations had been done 
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correctly and had generated the result that the safety improvements were not worthwhile on an 
economic basis, then it is quite possible that the company would nevertheless have been found 
liable for punitive damages.  The company had confronted the risk decision with explicit 
probabilities of risk, clear potential for adverse health effects, and a level of costs that would not 
have jeopardized the solvency of the company.  If companies cannot rely on economic efficiency 
prescriptions or negligence rules for determining the level of safety after such an analysis, then 
there may be no safe harbor other than the zero-risk level, which is infeasible.   
 
4.  Hindsight Bias 
The courts operate after the fact.  In the case of accidents, courts consider situations in 
which accidents have already occurred as opposed to contexts in which there is a prospective risk 
of an accident.  Given the retrospective nature of judicial proceedings, an important potential 
source of bias that has been identified in the literature on risk perception is that of “hindsight 
bias.”13  Judge Easterbrook characterized the problem as follows:  “The ex post perspective of 
litigation exerts a hydraulic force that distorts judgement.”14  After an accident, the potential 
causes often are much more apparent than they were before the accident occurred.  The role of 
hindsight extends beyond accidents to other domains as well as is reflected, for example, in the 
second-guessing of managerial decisions in major sports contests.  This section will consider two 
different tests of the role of hindsight bias.  The first test examines the explosion of the 
Challenger shuttle and the ability of respondents to assess the risk of disaster before and after the 
accident.  The second test involves a railroad accident case in which the respondents must also 
make the appropriate risk or liability decision as well as assess the risk.15   
 
Challenger Shuttle Risk Assessments 
In the Challenger problem, respondents had to assess the risk of an accident.  There were 
two possible scenarios--an ex ante scenario and an ex post scenario.  There were three different 
survey formulations of the Challenger question.  One group considered only the risk assessment 
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before the accident.  A second group considered the risk assessment after the accident, and a third 
group provided risk assessments both before and after the accident.  The sample in which the risk 
assessment was elicited for both time periods could potentially be more prone to subjects trying 
to be consistent in their responses, thus fostering hindsight bias through the survey structure.  
However, in practice the patterns of the ex ante and ex post probabilities for the samples that 
considered only one of these two risk assessments were not much different than for the sample 
that conceivably tried to give similar answers to both the before and after questions.   
The scenario before the Challenger accident was the following:  
 
Take yourself back, prior to the Challenger accident...  You are the administrator of 
NASA.  Congress has been reducing your budget so that it is no longer possible to continue space 
shuttle missions using liquid-fueled boosters.  However, NASA can substitute Air Force surplus, 
solid-propellant engines, allowing the project to continue.  Historically, NASA has considered 
solid-propellant boosters too dangerous for manned flight because they cannot be shut down after 
ignition whereas liquid-fueled engines can.  But with experience gained over years of manned 
space flight, and refined safety procedures currently in place, NASA engineers now estimate a 
fatal accident rate per launch with solid-propellant engines of 1/100,000.  The Air Force 
engineers at Cape Kennedy who have experience launching solid-propellant missiles estimate a 
fatal accident rate of 1/35. 
 
In your judgment as the NASA Administrator before the Challenger accident, what is the 
probability of a fatal accident?  Choose the range you believe to be the best estimate of the fatal 
accident risk per launch before the accident. 
Respondents then considered six different intervals in which the risk could fall.  The ex 
post scenario was analogous except that it concluded by noting the following.   
 
The Challenger accident was attributed to failure of the O-ring seals in the solid-
propellant engines.  That problem was fixed.  Indicate which you believe to be the best estimate 
of the fatal accident risk per launch after the Challenger accident and design fix.   
In the case of the subjects who considered only one of the two Challenger scenarios, the 
thirty-two subjects making the risk assessment ex post assessed the risk of another catastrophe as 
0.0158, and the twenty-seven judges who considered the risk ex ante had a mean risk assessment 
of 0.0125.  Although the ex post risk assessment is somewhat higher, the differences are not 
statistically significant (t=0.70).   
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In the case of the sample that considered both the before and after risk assessments, their 
risk assessments before the Challenger accident were 0.0090, and their risk assessments after the 
Challenger accident were 0.0100.  These risk assessment values differ very little—by 0.001—
with a difference that is not statistically significant (t=0.27).  Finally, pooling these results with 
those of the judges who considered only the ex ante or the ex post risk assessment leads to an ex 
ante risk assessment value of 0.0107 and an ex post risk assessment value of 0.0130.  This 
difference of 0.002 is not large and is also not statistically significant (t=0.73).   
The task of a judicial system in accident cases is to consider the risk decisionmaking 
process using the state of the information at the time of the accident.  How well can people 
disregard the information provided by the accident as part of this thought process?  In the case of 
the Challenger accident, the risk assessments after the accident and the risk assessments they 
would have made before the accident are almost identical, with the risk assessments before the 
accident being lower by a statistically insignificant amount.  NASA engineers before the accident 
put the risk at 0.00001, and Air Force engineers estimated the risk as 0.02857.  In each instance 
the judges’ risk assessment value of roughly 0.01 was of the same order of magnitude as that of 
the Air Force engineers and one thousand-fold greater than the risk estimated by the NASA 
engineers.  Clearly, the benefit of hindsight has pushed judges’ risk assessments much closer to 
the group which proved to be more accurate after the fact.   
The regression analysis in Table 7 of both the ex ante and the ex post probability as a 
function of the risk perception and implicit value of life parameters is interesting as well.  
Neither set of influences affects the ex post probability, but the ex ante probability is significantly 
related to both parameters of the risk perception bias analysis.  Subjects with a larger intercept 
iα̂ who are consequently likely to overestimate mortality risks are more likely to assess a higher 
ex ante probability.  In addition, subjects with higher values of the slope parameter iβ̂ which 
indicate a steeper responsiveness of subjects’ risk assessments with the value of the actual death 
level also indicates a positive relationship.  Thus, the more general patterns of risk assessment 
biases with respect to mortality risk carry over in terms of their influence on the hindsight case, 
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which is the ex ante probability.  In contrast, the ex post probability is unaffected by perceptional 
bias patterns for mortality risk.  Judging risk in hindsight is sensitive to the character of people’s 
perceptional biases more generally, but assessing the risk ex post does not exhibit the same kind 
of sensitivity.   
It is also noteworthy that the hindsight bias results differ from the findings for negligence 
and punitive damages judgments in terms of the influence of perceptional biases.  Hindsight 
probability beliefs are reflective of the broader perceptional biases, with respect to risk, whereas 
the earlier results were not affected by perceptional factors. 
 
Railroad Safety:  Ex Ante and Ex Post 
The second set of hindsight bias tests utilized a much more extensive case description.  
The case involved a railroad that was considering whether to make improvements in a section of 
track that would be related to potential property damage and economic loss.  Because of updates 
that were scheduled to occur at a later date, the decision involved only whether a railroad 
structure that had led to no accidents in the past would be permitted to continue in the future.  In 
one case the judges considered whether the railroad should be relieved of a National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) order to modify the track and make the safety 
improvements, which was an ex ante scenario.  The other group of judges considered the case 
after the accident had occurred so this was an ex post scenario, where the main decision was 
whether punitive damages should be awarded.  
The judges who considered the risk scenario ex ante largely supported relief of the NTSB 
order, as 85.1% did not favor requiring the safety improvements.  For the judges considering the 
ex post scenario, 76.6% were sympathetic with the railroad and only 23.4% agreed with punitive 
damages.  The differences in terms of the percentage of judges who were sympathetic to the 
railroad was not statistically significant (t=0.84).   
This behavior contrasts substantially with that observed using the same survey 
instruments with mock juries reported in Hastie and Viscusi’s (1998) discussion of 277 jurors.  
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For citizen respondents, 33 percent took an anti-railroad position in the foresight case, as 
compared to 15 percent for the judges.  However, whereas in the hindsight case 67 percent of the 
citizens took on anti-railroad position, only 25 percent of the judges did so.  Judges’ attitudes 
change very little across the foresight and hindsight cases, whereas there was a stark increase in 
jurors’ anti-railroad sentiment in the hindsight case. 
There is more evidence of hindsight bias in the judges’ risk assessments than in their 
safety and judicial decisions.  When asked to assess the risk of a serious accident happening 
before the line is closed, judges with the ex ante scenario assess the risk probability as 0.20, 
whereas judges with the ex post scenario assess the risk as 0.36.  The ex post risk assessment is 
consequently almost twice as great as the ex ante risk value, where this difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (t=3.16).  Judges also considered the risk on a linear grave danger 
scale, scaling the risk from zero to nine.  Such metrics are not as meaningful as a probability 
scale and do not have the same quantitative significance, but it is useful to report these results 
both to show the robustness of the findings and to facilitate comparisons with the literature.  
Judges with the ex ante scenario rated the risk as 2.45 and judges with the ex post scenario rated 
the risk as 4.28.  These differences are also significant at the 1% level (t=3.76).  Judges’ risk 
assessments seem to be more affected by hindsight bias than are their safety decisions. 
Judges also differ less than jurors in how hindsight affects their risk beliefs.  Judges’ 
assessed probability of a serious accident roughly doubles from 0.20 to 0.36, as do the risk 
assessments of mock jurors – from 0.34 to 0.59.  Although the absolute increase in probabilities 
is somewhat greater for judges than for the jurors – 0.16 versus 0.25 – the overall character of 
these results is that judges’ risk beliefs are more in line with those of mock jurors than are their 
overall railroad liability judgements.  This pattern suggests that it is how judges interpret legal 
rules rather than their risk beliefs that primarily accounts for the lesser effect of hindsight bias on 
their decisions. 
A useful test for the reasonableness of the judges’ responses is whether they are 
significantly related to benefit–cost principles, or a negligible test.  For the ex post scenario, the 
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survey indicated the cost of the damage as well as the repair cost.  Coupling this information with 
the judge’s own reported assessed probability of an accident makes it possible to determine 
whether the cost of the repairs exceed the expected benefit, as indicated by the expected accident 
costs.  For the foresight case, the survey did not indicate the dollar cost of an accident.  As a 
result, I will use the hindsight survey cost value in making the benefit–cost calculations for all 
scenarios, recognizing that different respondent assessments of the likely costs will affect their 
benefit–cost calculations in the foresight case. 
Table 8 divides the entire sample and each of the two survey scenario groups into 
different benefit–cost ratio quartiles.  The ex post scenario in which respondents knew the costs 
is the most informative.  Somewhat strikingly, none of the respondents with a benefit cost ratio 
below 6.1 favored punitive damages.  Only when the benefit-cost was 6.1 or greater did 
respondents become evenly divided between favoring and opposing punitive damages.  
Negligence alone does not lead judges to favor punitive damages in this instance, but rather there 
must be a quite substantial departure from benefit-cost norms.  In the analysis of mock jurors in 
Hastie and Viscusi (1998), no comparable relationship was evidenced for citizen attitudes, which 
were more random. 
The results for the ex ante scenario are more mixed, no doubt because these benefit-cost 
calculations assume a cost figure that may differ from what the respondent assessed.  The overall 
results for the full sample do, however, reflect a rise in anti-railroad sentiment with the benefit-
cost range, a result due to the strong relationship found in the ex post scenario. 
Table 9 breaks the responses into groups of individuals who are either for or against the 
railroad.  For the ex post scenario, the calculated benefit-cost ratio for the anti-railroad group is 
double that of the pro-railroad group, a difference which is statistically significant.  However, for 
the ex post scenario in which respondents lacked the cost data to do a benefit-cost test, the 
estimated benefit-cost results do not differ significantly across the two groups.  In this instance, 
the test reflects whether the perceived accident probabilities affect the railroad attitude, but the 
results do not control for perceived costs.  The strong ex post scenario results suggest that when 
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the pertinent economic factors are available that judges do think in an efficiency-oriented manner 
when making punitive damages judgements. 
The results in Table 10 for the regression analysis of the perceived probabilities and grave 
danger rating indicate that whether the judge considered the ex ante or the ex post scenario is 
quite influential.  Receiving the ex post version of the survey increases the judges’ perceived 
probability of a train derailment by 0.17 and increases their perceived danger rating by 1.8, where 
each of these effects is just under 20% of the associated risk scale.  The other results in Table 10 
are less stable across the risk perception measures.  The perception equation’s slope 
coefficient iβ̂ is negative in the grave danger equation, indicating that subjects who are more 
responsive to perceived risk levels have a lower perceived risk of danger.  The perception 
equation’s slope is not, however, statistically significant in the perceived probability of train 
derailment equation.  Finally, the few subjects who indicated an infinite value of life assess 
higher risk levels, as this variable may be a measure of whether the subject understood the survey 
and gave measured responses or simply gravitated to extreme values. 
The determinants of the probability of taking a stance against the railroad (i.e., not 
favoring relief of the NTSB order or favoring punitive damages ex post) can be analyzed using 
probit regressions of the probability of taking an anti-railroad position reported in Table 11.  
Hindsight effects largely are not evident in the anti-railroad position estimates.  The fact that the 
respondent took a survey that considered the accident ex post had no statistically significant 
effect on whether the subject took an anti-railroad position in the first three equations.  The 
estimated coefficients for this variable are substantially smaller than their associated standard 
errors.  Only when this variable is interacted with the assessed benefit-cost variable in equation 4 
is it significant, but this influence depends on the net effect of the negative survey indicator 
variable and the positive interaction term. 
The most influential substantive aspects of the cases have the expected effects if one 
believes that judges should be balancing benefits and costs when making a decision regarding the 
railroad.  The probability of ruling against the railroad increases with the perceived probability of 
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derailment (equation 2), the estimated benefit-cost ratio (equation 3), and, more strongly, with 
the benefit-cost ratio when judges had full information to make such an estimate (equation 4). 
The other noteworthy result in Table 11 is that the role of perceptional biases is 
consistently influential.  The perception slope parameter iβ̂ is negative and statistically 
significant in every case.  A higher value of the slope parameter indicates greater responsiveness 
of risk perceptions to the actual risk level.  Respondents who are more on track in terms of their 
linkage of perceived risks to actual risks appear to be less likely to take an anti-railroad position.  
This result continues to hold even after including the judges’ perceived probability of a train 
derailment or assessed benefit-cost ratios.  Thus, perceptional biases appear to exert an influence 
beyond simply how they affect the assessed case-specific risks. 
 
5.  Risk Ambiguity 
One of the most well-established results in the literature on the rationality of choice under 
uncertainty is the Ellsberg Paradox.  When given an opportunity to potentially win a prize in a 
lottery, subjects generally prefer a precise probability of success to ambiguous probabilities with 
the same mean value.  Similarly, results suggest that when facing a small probability of a loss 
that there is ambiguity aversion, as subjects prefer a precise mean probability to a more dispersed 
ambiguous probability with the same mean.  This same type of effect could carry over to judicial 
contexts as well to the extent that there are more penalties on firms which undertake risk 
decisions in contexts of uncertainty.  This phenomenon has been a continuing theme of the tort 
liability literature.  Tort liability critics have often suggested that courts are particularly harsh on 
firms that make innovative decisions posing novel risks as opposed to firms choosing 
technologies with well-established risks.16  This bias deters research on products such as new 
prescription drugs for pregnant women and new birth control devices.   
Drugs with Uncertain Risk Properties 
The survey presented judges with two situations involving risk ambiguity with respect to 
two different problems--the risk of a product and the awarding of damages.  The first regulatory 
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decision was one in which the current biases of FDA regulations favor consideration of the 
maximum risk rather than the mean risk.  The particular example used involved a choice of a 
contrast agent for a CAT scan, where this example is based on the actual risk associated with 
such products with the main difference being that the specific probabilities are hypothetical.  
 
You are running a pharmaceutical company and must choose only one of two variants of 
a drug to market as a contrast agent for CAT scans.  Your company has been selling Old Drug 
for decades.  Old Drug works well, but there is a well-established 1/100,000 chance that the 
patient will suffer an adverse reaction and die.  Your research team has already developed New 
Drug that performs identically and will have the same price and manufacturing costs, but New 
Drug poses uncertain risks.  Based on the clinical trials, the best estimate of the expected level 
risk is that it is 1/150,000, but the risk is not known for sure.  Some scientists believe the risk 
from New Drug is zero and some believe the risk could be as high as 1/50,000.  Which drug 
would you choose to market?  You must pick one.  Circle your choice below. 
Overall, the old drug with the known but higher risk was the choice of 57% of the judges.  
Rational Bayesian decision-making suggests that the mean risk should be the guide, or all 
subjects should prefer the New Drug.  It poses a lower risk on average. The new drug should be 
preferred, so that 100 percent of the respondents should prefer the new drug, but only 43 percent 
do.  The probit analysis in Table 12 of the probability to approve the new drug indicates no 
statistically significant effects except for the implicit value-of-life variable.  Higher valuations of 
one’s own life, which would seem to indicate more rational responses given the appropriate level 
for the judge respondent group, are associated with being more likely to approve the superior 
new drug.  
 
Variance of Potential Damages 
Another aspect in which a risk could be ambiguous pertains to the level of damages.  In 
some cases firms are unlucky in that the damages amount that occurs is much less than the loss 
that one might have suspected on average, whereas in other instances the firm may have been 
fortunate in incurring damages amounts less than might be expected on average.  Will 
respondents be guided by what actually occurred, what might have occurred, or some 
combination of the two?  From the standpoint of appropriate incentives, one should set the 
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damages amount based on the actual loss, not on what might have been.  Failing to do so is a 
common error in thinking about punitive damages.17  
The scenario in which the company was fortunate  given the damages lottery it created 
through its actions was the following:   
 
Acme Oil Company has been found negligent and liable for an oil well blowout that 
caused $10 million in property damage and no personal injury.  The company in many respects 
was fortunate in that such blowouts have a 90% chance of $100 million in property damages and 
a 10% chance of minor damage of $10 million.  What damages award amount would you select?  
The counterpart scenario in which the company did not fare as well with respect to the 
damages lottery was the following:   
 
Acme Oil Company has been found negligent and liable for an oil well blowout that 
caused $10 million in property damage and no personal injury.  The company in many respects 
was unfortunate in that such blowouts have a 90% chance of no damage and a 10% change of 
$10 million in damages.  What damages amount would you select? 
All but five of the judges answered these questions in line with law and economics 
principles, focusing on the actual damages amount that occurred.  Even though the judges were 
given six damages award categories from which to choose, 92% of them correctly selected $10 
million dollars as the damages amount for both cases.  The regression analysis in Table 12 
indicates that the value of the proposed damages award is not sensitive to the risk perception or 
value-of-life variables, which is not surprising since there is little variation in the recommended 
award amount.  Judges’ assessment of damages awards consequently does not seem to be 
affected by risk ambiguity biases and is quite consistent with what one would do if implementing 
sound law and economics principles.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
Judges are human and may reflect the same kinds of irrationalities as other individuals.  
Judges did exhibit the well-established pattern of overestimating small risks and underestimating 
large risks, but their risk assessments for substantial risks were not substantially in error.  Judges’ 
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expressed risk-dollar tradeoffs as reflected in their implicit values of life were in line with that of 
other population groups in terms of the general order of magnitude of the valuation.   
The two key questions explored in this paper were whether these aspects of individual 
preferences in valuation affected attitudes in judicial contexts and whether decisions in these 
contexts exhibited forms of irrationality that have been identified in the literature.  Judges’ 
application of negligence rules became much more out of line with standard law and economic 
prescriptions once substantial nonpecuniary damages were involved.  Large stakes-small 
probability catastrophic events seemed to pose greater problems for judicial decisionmaking than 
higher probability-lower loss events.  The potential for such errors and the large costs of error in 
terms of incorrect major penalties highlight the potential benefits of judicial review for such large 
stakes cases.   
Judges, however, are much less prone to hindsight bias than are jurors in their treatment 
of corporate safety decisions.  Indeed, in making legal judgements there was little effect of 
hindsight for judges, as compared to substantial effects for mock jurors.  An interesting aspect of 
the results is that whereas the safety decisions of the judges were not affected by the hindsight 
bias, there was consistent evidence that the risk assessments were sensitive to whether the 
judgment was being made ex ante or ex post.  Unlike jurors, judges seem to be better able to put 
aside potential biases in risk assessments that arise with hindsight and still make sound decisions.   
The scenarios involving hindsight were noteworthy in that the evidence of hindsight bias 
that was reflected in the results was correlated with broader patterns of judges’ perceptional 
biases.  Judges’ risk beliefs and value of life measures were far less consequential with respect to 
interpretation of legal rules in the other scenarios examined. 
Judges’ performance with respect to risk ambiguity also offers two sets of messages.  
First, judges were remarkably sound in their setting of damages in complex situations involving 
uncertainty.  Nevertheless, a second set of results indicated that judges did exhibit risk ambiguity 
aversion, which is a bias that is prevalent in risk assessment practices throughout the U. S. 
Federal government safety agencies.  Judges favored well known, established risks to smaller but 
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more uncertain risks for new products.  The frequently cited bias of the courts against novel risks 
created by innovative products has a similar economic structure.    
Overall, judges did exhibit many of the patterns of biases in risk judgements that have 
been the focus of the literature on the rationality of choice under uncertainty.  For the most part, 
these biases do not contaminate that thinking of judges with respect to their interpretation of 
legal rules.  Even in the case of hindsight bias, for which there was some evident influence of 
risk beliefs, judges performed very well overall and took a more efficiency-based approach than 
do mock jurors. 
The policy implications of this research are threefold.  First, recommendations that judges 
be given more authority over issues such as damages in complex cases appear to be well 
founded.  Recent proposals that judges be given authority to set punitive damages would be in 
line with the character of these results in which judges often avoided well-established patterns of 
juror error, both with respect to hindsight biases and uncertain levels of damages for an 
accident.18 The second policy implication is that input from experts in risk analysis would be a 
beneficial addition to judicial decisionmaking.  Situations involving complex risks, such as those 
involving risk ambiguity and the need to consider the state of the information at the time of the 
accident, are potentially subject to distortion in terms of how people think about the probabilities.  
The urgings by U. S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer and others that courts avail 
themselves of scientific expertise could lead to the kinds of judicial reforms that could potentially 
alleviate these biases.19  The final recommendation is that there are clearcut benefits to judicial 
review.  Decisions involving complex risks pose by far the greatest challenges to rational 
economic decisionmaking.  It is not surprising that this class of issues will also pose the greatest 
problems for judicial decisionmaking.  Small probability-large loss events are particularly subject 
to error.  There is a tendency to overestimate such risks, to depart from usual negligence criteria, 
and to fall prey to hindsight bias.  In such cases, the costs of bad court decisions can be huge, as 
catastrophic risks tend to generate similarly enormous damages awards.  Resolving these issues 
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satisfactorily no doubt will benefit from the potential for judicial review that provides an 
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1 For a comprehensive perspective on these issues, see Viscusi (1998).  A detailed analysis of 
these issues for hazardous waste cleanup efforts appears in Viscusi and Hamilton (forthcoming).  
An exposition of the underlying theory appears in Noll and Krier (1990).   
2 This possibility is examined by Kunreuther (1978). 
3 Other aspects of the risk can affect risk beliefs as well, such as newspaper coverage and the 
dread associated with the hazard, such as the fear of dying in an airplane crash.  See Fischhoff et 
al. (1981). 
4 For a commentary on this paper and a comparison with Bayesian learning models, see Hakes 
and Viscusi (1997).   
5 The number of respondents to these questions ranged from 79 to 84 because of missing 
values for some of the survey answers.  Respondents who did not answer typically skipped the 
entire page since it was much more time consuming than the rest of the survey. 
6 For review of this literature, see Viscusi (1993).  
7 Since only three respondents indicated an infinite value of life, it is not surprising that 
neither perception variable is statistically significant. 
8  For an exposition of these negligence rules in law and economics see Posner (1986) and 
Polinsky (1989), among others. 
9 This statement will reduce but perhaps not eliminate the possible influence of risk aversion 
in affecting some of the responses.  Since the loss size variation primarily affects the company 
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not the parties injured, negligence rules should be applied in a risk-neutral fashion.  Moreover, 
the $5 million value-of-life figure fully reflects the social loss, and no risk aversion bonus is 
warranted from an economic standpoint. 
10 It should also be noted that the losses associated with this risk occur over the life of the 
plane so that including the role of discounting would reduce the discounted expected value of the 
loss to an amount below $1,500. 
11 See his comments in Carroll v. Otis Elevator, 896 F2d (1990).   
12 The GMC truck analysis was the focus of Moseley v. General Motors, 213 Ga. App. 875, 
447, S.E. 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).  For a review of the analogous Ford Pinto analysis see Viscusi 
(1991). 
13 For discussions of hindsight bias see Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (1998) and Kelman, 
Elliot, and Folger (1998).  Also see Rachlinski (1998) and Jolls (1998). 
14 Supra note 11. 
15 This scenario was developed by Reid Hastie for a study of juror behavior.   
16 See, for example, Huber (1988) and Viscusi (1991). 
17 The importance of thinking about damages in terms of the actual loss rather than potential 
losses is articulated by Polinsky and Shavell (1998). 
18 See Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998). 
19 For a fuller discussion of society’s efforts to deal with risk more generally, see Breyer 
(1993).   
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Table 1 
 Actual and Perceived Risks of Death for Major Sources of Mortality 
    











Botulism 2 1,250.7 225.0 
Fireworks accident 5 667.4 127.1 
Measles 5 1,335.2 231.9 
Lightning strikes 89 1,337.6 206.3 
Pregnancy (birthing 
complications) 
320 58,082.4 4,850.7 
Appendicitis 500 3,080.3 589.4 
Accidental electrocution 670 4,811.0 1,076.9 
Hepatitis 677 8,574.8 1,789.9 
Accidental firearm discharges 1,416 28,844.4 8,675.2 
Accidental drowning 3,979 6,491.3 1,964.2 
Fire and flames 4,175 11,973.9 3,634.7 
Asthma 4,750 14,533.5 2,962.5 
Accidental poisoning 5,200 13,535.3 1,909.6 
Accidental falls 12,313 9,849.3 2,057.3 
Stomach cancer 13,640 42,415.7 14,145.3 
Homicide 24,614 48,093.4 21,634.1 
Breast cancer 45,000 84,511.9 31,750.0 
Diabetes 47,664 61,812.0 12,907.6 
Stroke 144,088 132,480.6 44,538.7 
Lung cancer 145,000 149,512.0 53,317.2 
All forms of cancer 505,322 462,148.8 185,024.8 
Heart disease 720,000 518,422.3 169,867.2 
All causes 2,148,463 2,993,906.0 1,158,700.0 
    
Note:  The number of observations range from 79 to 84 for the different  
mortality risk groups.  
 
Table 2 
Regression Results for Determinants of ln(Perceived Deaths) 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Ordinary Least Squares Fixed Effects 

























2R  0.54 0.57 0.73 0.76 
Note: The model includes 1,874 observations; all regression estimates are robust and clustered 
by individual. 
* Significant at 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
** Significant at 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 




Distribution of Implicit Valuations of Life Elicited From State Judges 
 
 
Value of life range     Number responding 
0 - $500,000  42 
$500,000 - $2,000,000  16 
$2,000,000 -  $5,000,000  12 
$5,000,000 -  $10,000,000  4 
0ver   $10,000,000  14 




Mean 3,551,136  
(Standard error of 
mean) 
($564,527)  
Median 1,250,000  
 
Note:  Values were coded as the mid-point of each range, using 
$15,000,000 for the over-$10,000,000 category when calculating the mean.  
Responses indicating infinite value of life were omitted from the 
calculation of the mean and standard error of the mean.  The total sample 
size was 91. 
 
Table 4 
Regression Estimates of the Effect of Risk Perception Biases 
on the Self-Reported Value of Life 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 


















2R  0.04 --- 
The value of life model omits non-responses and responses of an infinite value of life. 
* -- Significant at 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 5 
Relation of Judges’ Opinions on Repairing Airplane Defect to Whether Punitive Damages 
Should Apply if an Accident Occurs 
 
Panel A: Property Damage Low: $15,000 
 Repair Plane Don’t Repair Plane Total 
Punitives apply   5 (11.4%)   3(6.8%)   8 (18.2%) 
Punitives don’t apply   9 (20.4%) 27 (61.4%) 36 (81.8%) 
Total 14 (31.8%) 30 (68.2%) 44 (100 %) 
 
Panel B: Property Damage High: $1.5 million 
 Repair Plane Don’t Repair Plane Total 
Punitives apply   7 (24.2%)   1(3.4%)   8 (27.6%) 
Punitives don’t apply   7 (24.2%) 14 (48.2%) 21 (72.4%) 
Total 14 (48.4%) 15 (51.6%) 29 (100 %) 
 
Panel C: Personal Injury High: $1.5 billion 
 Repair Plane Don’t Repair Plane Total 
Punitives apply 11 (68.8%) 0 (0%) 11 (68.8%) 
Punitives don’t apply   5 (31.2%) 0 (0%)   5 (31.2%) 
Total 16 (100 %) 0 (0%) 16 (100 %) 
 
Panel D: Overall Results 
 Repair Plane Don’t Repair Plane Total 
Punitives apply 23 (25.8%)   4(4.5%) 27 (30.3%) 
Punitives don’t apply 21 (23.6%) 41 (46.1%) 62 (69.7%) 
Total 44 (49.4%) 45 (50.6%) 89 (100 %) 
 
t-statistics for comparisons of scenario responses: 
 
Decision to repair airplane:    Decision to award punitive damages:  
Scenario A vs. Scenario B: 1.427   Scenario A vs. Scenario B: 0.943  
Scenario B vs. Scenario C: 4.034***   Scenario B vs. Scenario C: 2.854***  







Note: *** -- Significant at 99% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 6 
Probit Regressions of Judges’ Opinions on Repairing Airplane Defect and Whether Punitive 
Damages Should Apply if an Accident Occurs 
 Coefficient (standard error) 
 Repair cargo 
door = 1 
Repair cargo 
door = 1 
Punitives 
apply = 1 
Punitives 





















































The observations from the scenario describing human fatalities were omitted from the repair 
cargo door equations. 
 
* significant at 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
** significant at 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 7 
Hindsight Bias: Ex Ante and Ex  Post Perceived Risks of Challenger Explosion 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 


























2R  0.43 0.02 
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 8 
Correlation of Implicit Net Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratios (B/C) with Probability of Ruling 
Against Railroad 
 
Ex Post scenario only (47 observations)  
B/C Percentile Range Net Benefit B/C Probability of Ruling 
Against Railroad 
00-24 -1.1-0.1 0.52-1.04 0.00 
25-50 0.1-6.1 1.04-3.65 0.00 
51-74 6.1-9.7 3.65-5.22 0.50 
75-100 9.7-18.1 5.22-8.87 0.53 
 
Ex Ante scenario only (47 observations)  
B/C Percentile Range Net Benefit B/C Probability of Ruling 
Against Railroad 
00-24 -2.3-0.1 0.00-1.04 0.10 
25-50 0.1-0.1 1.04-1.04 0.13 
51-74 0.1-2.5 1.04-2.09 0.30 
75-100 2.5-20.5 2.09-9.91 0.09 
 
Entire sample (94 observations) 
B/C Percentile Range Net Benefit B/C Probability of Ruling 
Against Railroad 
00-24 -2.3-0.1 0.00-1.04 0.07 
25-50 0.1-2.5 1.04-2.09 0.12 
51-74 2.5-7.9 2.09-4.43 0.13 
75-100 7.9-20.5 4.43-9.92 0.44 
 
Table 9 
Correlation of Railroad Verdict with Implicit Net Benefits and Benefit-Cost Ratios (B/C)  
 
Ex Post scenario: 
Ruling Mean Net Benefit Mean B/C Ratio 
For Railroad 4.17 2.81 
Against Railroad 12.97 6.64 
t-statistic  (for vs. against railroad): 6.39, significant at 99% confidence  
level for B/C comparison 
 
Ex Ante scenario: 
Ruling Mean Net Benefit Mean B/C Ratio 
For Railroad 2.65 2.15 
Against Railroad 1.99 1.86 
t-statistic  (for vs. against railroad): 0.40 for B/C comparison 
 
Entire sample: 
Ruling Mean Net Benefit Mean B/C Ratio 
For Railroad 3.37 2.46 
Against Railroad 8.70 4.78 
t-statistic  (for vs. against railroad): 3.20, significant at 99% confidence  
level for B/C comparison 
 
Table 10 
Hindsight Bias: Regression Analysis of Ex Ante and Ex Post Perceived  
Probabilities of Train Derailment 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 
 Perceived probability of 
train derailment (x100) 




































2R  0.21 0.26 
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test 
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level, two-tailed test 
 
Table 11 
Hindsight Bias:  Probit Regression of Probability of Ruling against Railroad 
 
 Coefficient (Asymptotic Standard Error) 



































































Ex post scenario x 
benefit/cost ratio 
   0.471** 
(0.226) 
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
 
Table 12 
Novelty and Uncertainty: Decision to Approve New Drug and Damages for Oil Well Blowout 
 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 
 Approve new drug = 1 
Probit 




























2R   --- 0.01 
* Significant at the 90% confidence level, two-tailed test. 
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